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Abstract. In this paper, we evaluate available steganographic techniques for 
SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) that can be used for creating covert channels 
during signaling phase of VoIP (Voice over IP) call. Apart from characterizing 
existing steganographic methods we provide new insights by introducing new 
techniques. We also estimate amount of data that can be transferred in signal-
ling messages for typical IP telephony call.  
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1 Introduction 
Steganography is a process of hiding secret data inside other, normally transmitted 
data. Usually, it means hiding of a secret message within an ordinary message and its 
extraction at the destination point. In an ideal situation, anyone scanning this informa-
tion will fail to know whether it contains covert data or not. A covert channel [9] is 
one of the most popular steganographic techniques that can be applied in the net-
works. The covert channel offers an opportunity to “manipulate certain properties of 
the communications medium in an unexpected, unconventional, or unforeseen way, in 
order to transmit information through the medium without detection by anyone other 
than the entities operating the covert channel” [17].  
Nowadays, VoIP is one of the most popular services in IP networks. It stormed into 
the telecom market and changed it entirely. As it is used worldwide more willingly, 
the traffic volume that it generates is still increasing. That is why VoIP traffic may be 
used to enable hidden communication throughout IP networks. Applications of the 
VoIP covert channels differ as they can pose a threat to the network communication or 
can be used to improve the functioning of VoIP (e.g. security like in [11] or quality of 
service like in [10]). The first application of the covert channel is more dangerous as it 
can lead to the confidential information leakage. It is hard to assess what bandwidth of 
a covert channel poses a serious threat, it depends on the security policy that is im-
plemented in the network. For example: The US Department of Defense specifies in 
[16] that any covert channel with bandwidth higher than 100 bps must be considered 
insecure for average security requirements. Moreover for high security requirements it 
should not exceed 1 bps. 
In this paper we present available covert channels that may be utilized for hidden 
communication for SIP protocol used as a signalling protocol for VoIP service. More-
over, we introduce new steganographic methods that, to our best knowledge, were not 
described earlier. For each of these methods we estimate potential bandwidth to later 
evaluate how much information may be transferred in a typical IP telephony call. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we circumscribe the types of VoIP 
traffic and a general communication flow for IP telephony call. In Section 3, we de-
scribe available steganographic methods that may be used to create covert channels 
for signalling messages. Then, in Section 4, we estimate a total amount of data that 
may be transferred with use of the SIP protocol. Finally, Section 5 concludes our 
work. 
2 VoIP Communication Flow 
VoIP is a real-time service that enables voice conversations through IP networks. 
Protocols that are used for creating IP telephony may be divided into four following 
groups: 
a. Signalling protocols which allow to create, modify, and terminate connections 
between the calling parties. Nowadays the most popular are SIP [14], H.323 [6], 
and H.248/Megaco [3], 
b. Transport protocols, from which the most important one is RTP [15], which pro-
vides end-to-end network transport functions suitable for applications transmitting 
real-time audio. RTP is used in conjunction with UDP (or rarely TCP) for trans-
port of digital voice stream, 
c. Speech codecs e.g. G.711, G.729, G.723.1 that allow to compress/decompress 
digitalized human voice and prepare it for transmitting in IP networks, 
d. Other supplementary protocols like RTCP [15], SDP [5], or RSVP etc. that com-
plete VoIP functionality. For purposes of this paper we explain the role of SDP 
protocol, which is used with SIP messages to describe multimedia sessions and to 
negotiate their parameters. 
 
IP telephony connection may be divided into two phases: a signalling phase and a 
conversation phase. In both of these phases certain types of traffic are exchanged 
between calling parties. In this paper we consider VoIP service based on the SIP sig-
naling protocol (with SDP) and RTP (with RTCP as control protocol) for audio stream 
transport. It means that during the signalling phase of the call certain SIP messages are 
exchanged between SIP endpoints (called: SIP User Agents). SIP messages usually 
traverse through SIP network servers: proxies or redirects that help end-users to locate 
and reach each other. After this phase, a conversation phase begins, where audio 
(RTP) streams flow bi-directly between a caller and a callee. VoIP traffic flow de-
scribed above and distinguished phases of the call are presented in Fig. 1. For more 
clarity, we omitted the SIP network servers in this diagram (as they interpret the sig-
nalling messages and can modify only a few fields of SIP message which we will not 
use for steganographic purposes). Also potential security mechanisms in traffic ex-
changes were ignored. 
   
Fig. 1. VoIP call setup based on SIP/SDP/RTP/RTCP protocols (based on [7]) 
3 VoIP Signalling Covert Channels Overview and New Insights 
In this section we will provide an overview of existing and new steganographic tech-
niques used for creation of covert channels for VoIP that may be used during signal-
ling phase of the call. To calculate potential amount of information that may be ex-
changed between calling parties we define total amount of covert data (BT) that refers 
to information transferred (in bits) in SIP signalling messages (in one direction) with 
the use of all described steganographic methods. It can be expressed as: 
 
 
(1) 
where: Bj describes amount of covert data transferred with use of the covert channel 
created by each steganographic method used during VoIP signalling and k is a number 
of steganographic techniques used for VoIP signalling. 
Traffic generated during the signalling phase of the call is provided from SIP sig-
nalling messages that are exchanged between both endpoints. That is why, we can 
point out the following steganographic methods to create covert channels: 
• TCP/UDP/IP steganography in transport and network layers of TCP/IP stack, 
• SIP/SDP protocols steganography in application layer of TCP/IP stack. 
 
3.1 IP/TCP/UDP Protocols Steganography  
TCP/UDP/IP protocols steganography utilizes the fact that only few fields of headers 
in the packet are changed during communication process ([12], [1], [13]). Covert data 
is usually inserted into redundant fields (provided, but often unneeded) for abovemen-
tioned protocols and then transferred to the receiving side. In TCP/IP stack, there are a 
number of methods available, whereby covert channels may be established and data 
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can be exchanged between communication parties secretly. An analysis of the headers 
of typical TCP/IP protocols e.g. IP, UDP, TCP, but also e.g. HTTP (Hypertext Trans-
fer Protocol) or ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) results in fields that are 
either unused or optional [1], [18]. This reveals many possibilities where data may be 
stored and transmitted. As described in [12] the IP header possesses fields that are 
available to be used as covert channels. The total capacity of those fields is rather high 
(as for the steganographic technique) and may exceed 32 bits per packet and there are 
also fields of TCP and UDP protocols that can be also used for this purpose. Notice 
that this steganographic method plays an important role for VoIP communication 
because protocols mentioned above are present in every packet (regardless, if it is a 
signalling message, audio packet, or control message). 
 
3.2 SIP/SDP Protocols Steganography 
To our best knowledge little research effort has been made to use SIP messages as a 
covert channel. For example in [2] authors have shown how the bouncing mechanism 
is used for SIP messages to secretly transfer data. The interest of research in SIP/SDP 
protocols steganography is rather low because the signalling phase is rather short and 
only few messages are exchanged during this phase. In spite of this observation we 
want to perform an analysis of covert channels that may be utilized for SIP signalling 
protocol to show how much information may be transferred in VoIP signalling mes-
sages – as mentioned in Section 1 transferring even 1 bps may be considered as a 
threat. When call setup begins, certain SIP signalling messages are exchanged be-
tween calling parties as depicted in Fig. 1 (marked as 1). Exemplary SIP message 
(with SDP session description) looks as presented in Fig. 2. 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
INVITE sip:bob@biloxi.example.com SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP client.atlanta.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bK74bf9 
Max-Forwards: 70 
From: Alice <sip:alice@atlanta.example.com>;tag=9fxced76sl 
To: Bob <sip:bob@biloxi.example.com> 
Call-ID: 3848276298220188511@atlanta.example.com 
CSeq: 12345 INVITE 
Contact: AliceM <sip:alice@client.atlanta.example.com;transport=tcp> 
Content-Type: application/sdp 
Content-Length: 151 
  
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
   v=0 
   o=alice 2890844526 2890844526 IN IP4 client.atlanta.example.com 
   s=- 
   c=IN IP4 192.0.2.101 
   t=0 0 
   k=clear:9123123kjnhdasdoq12e31021n2e4 
   m=audio 49172 RTP/AVP 0 
   a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000 
Fig. 2. Exemplary SIP INVITE signalling message with SDP session description  
(bolded are fields and tokens that can be used for covert transmission) 
 
First part of the message in Fig. 2 (signalling message header – marked with grey 
filling) is a SIP INVITE message (which initiates a call), the second part is an SDP 
session description (body of the message – marked with white filling).  
 
3.2.1 SIP Parameters, Tokens and Fields Steganography 
In SIP signalling messages there are certain tokens, like tag (in From field line 4, that 
forms SIP dialog identifier) or branch (in Via field line 2 that forms transaction identi-
fier). They consist of random strings generated by user’s endpoint when the connec-
tion is initiated. Also the fields: Call-ID (line 6, which uniquely identifies a call) and 
first part of CSeq field (line 7, initial sequence number that serves as a way to identify 
and order transactions) must be generated randomly. All abovementioned fields and 
tokens can be straightforwardly utilized as a low-bandwidth, one direction covert 
channel. However, for tag token [14] it stands that “when a tag is generated (…) it 
must be globally unique and cryptographically random with at least 32 bits of ran-
domness…” – that means that the inserted secret value must be chosen appropriately. 
For value of a branch token the situation is similar, it must begin with the characters 
"z9hG4bK" (called magic cookie) to ensure that previous, older SIP version’s imple-
mentation would not pick such a value. The rest of branch content is implementation-
defined. Next, Call-ID is generated by the combination of a random string and the 
endpoint’s host name or IP address (random_string@host_name). Moreover CSeq 
field consists of a sequence number and a method name; sequence number value, 
which is chosen arbitrarily, may be used for covert transmission. The only requirement 
for this number is that it must be expressible as a 32-bit unsigned integer and must be 
less than 231. For all of the mentioned tokens and fields there are no rules inside a SIP 
standard (besides for CSeq) that specify their length, so we can increase the bandwidth 
of the covert channel by choosing appropriate length of those values. There is also a 
field Max-Forwards (line 3), that is used for loop detection. It may be also used as a 
covert channel, if the value applies to certain rules: SIP standard defines only that the 
initial value of Max-Forwards should be 70, however other values are also allowed. 
Eventually, we can also utilize strings in SIP messages e.g. in Contact field (line 8) – a 
string AliceM. Such string values have no direct impact on the communication itself. 
Fields that can be exploited in the same way as Contact include (more rarely, not 
mandatory) fields like: Subject, Call-Info, Organization, Reply-To, Timestamp, User-
Agent, and other. 
 
3.2.2 SIP Security Mechanisms Steganography 
For SIP/SDP protocols steganography we can also utilize security mechanisms that are 
executed to provide security services like authentication and confidentiality for signal-
ling messages. Especially end-to-end mechanisms are important for our purposes as 
they allow to transfer data directly between end users. In this article we will present 
how to use end-to-end SIP security mechanism S/MIME (Secure MIME) [4] to create 
covert channel. Fig. 3 presents how the SDP content, embedded into the SIP INVITE 
message, may be encrypted and signed using S/MIME. The secured parts of the mes-
sage are divided from themselves using boundary value (992d915fef419824 value in 
Fig. 3). It is the first value that can be utilized as a covert channel as its length and 
value is chosen randomly. Next, the first part between the boundary values is the ap-
plication/pkcs7-mime binary envelopedData structure that encapsulates encrypted 
SDP session description. The second part between the boundary values is a signature 
of the payload (application/pkcs7-signature).  
The second possibility for hidden communication is to use the signature bits inside 
the boundary values (application/pkcs7-signature) to transfer covert data. Therefore, 
we resign from signature verification (it is the cost of using this method), but instead, 
we gain an opportunity to send additional covert data. The amount of data that can be 
transferred covertly depends on what hash function is used and must be matched prop-
erly. 
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INVITE sip: bob@biloxi.example.com SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 160.85.170.139:5060;branch=z9hG4bK4129d28b8904 
To: Bob <sip: bob@biloxi.example.com> 
From: Alice <sip: alice@atlanta.example.com>;tag=daa21162 
Call-ID: 392c3f2b568e92a8eb37d448886edd1a@160.85.170.139 
CSeq: 1 INVITE 
Max-Forwards: 70 
Contact: <sip:alice@client.atlanta.example.com:5060> 
Content-Type: multipart/signed;boundary=992d915fef419824; 
micalg=sha1;protocol=application/pkcs7-signature 
Content-Length: 3088 
--992d915fef419824 
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; 
smime-type=envelopeddata; name=smime.p7m 
Content-Disposition: attachment;handling=required;filename=smime.p7m 
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary 
<envelopedData object encapsulating encrypted SDP attachment not shown> 
--992d915fef419824 
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name=smime.p7s 
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7s; 
handling=required 
 
ghyHhHUujhJhjH77n8HHGTrfvbnj756tbB9HG4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6 
  QpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6jH77n8HHGghyHhHUujhJh756tbB9HGTrfvbnj       
n8HHGTrfvhJhjH776tbB9HG4VQbnj7567GhIGfHfYT6ghyHhHUujpfyF4 
        7GhIGfHfYT64VQbnj756  
 
--992d915fef419824-- 
Fig. 3. Example of SIP INVITE signalling message secured with S/MIME mechanism 
 
3.2.3 SDP Protocol Steganography 
For SDP protocol available covert channels are similar to those presented for SIP. In 
Fig. 1 SDP session description is enclosed in two SIP messages (INVITE from SIP 
UA A to SIP UA B and in 200 OK response in the reverse direction). It is possible to 
use session description fields in SDP protocol, some of them do not carry important 
information and other are ignored (but must be present in SIP/SDP message in order 
to be compliant with SDP). This includes bolded fields in Fig. 2 (second part with 
white filling): v (version – field ignored by SIP), o (owner/creator) – there is a ran-
domly generated session identifier (2890844526), and the name of the owner/creator, 
s (session name – field ignored by SIP), t (time session is active – field ignored by 
SIP) and k (potential encryption key if the secure communication is used).  
To summarize: for SIP/SDP protocols steganography creation of covert channels is 
possible because in specifications of these protocols there are no strict rules how to 
generate tokens and parameters and what is their desired length.  
 
3.2.4 Other SIP/SDP Protocol Steganography Possibilities 
For both protocols other steganographic methods may be utilized. For example, like in 
[8] we can use nonprintable characters (like spaces [SP] or tabs [HT]) or their se-
quences after the SIP header fields. Described situation is presented in Fig. 4. 
The next method from [8] exploits the fact that the order of headers in the SIP/SDP 
message depends on implementation, thus reordering of headers is possible as a mean 
to covertly send data. If we consider exemplary signalling message form Fig. 4, if field 
Call-ID is after CSeq it can denote that binary “1” was sent, while if the order is re-
versed the value is “0”. The last method exploits case modification (upper and lower 
cases), because names of the field are case-insensitive (so e.g. FROM header means 
“1” while to header “0”), but this technique is rather easy to uncover. 
While call lasts, some signaling messages may also be exchanged to influence cer-
tain parameters of the session (e.g. codec). Bandwidth and steganographic techniques 
for SIP/SDP remain the same as described in the signalling phase. Moreover, during 
the conversation phase, we can also utilize SIP message like OPTIONS, which is used 
for sharing capabilities of the endpoints, e.g. to be able to support additional services. 
Such messages may be intentionally invoked (to some extent) to increase the covert 
channel bandwidth for these steganographic techniques. It is also worth noting that the 
SIP signalling messages are exchanged after the conversation phase is finished 
(marked on Fig. 1 with 3). 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
INVITE[SP]sip:bob@biloxi.example.com[SP]SIP/2.0[SP][SP][HT][SP][HT] 
From: Alice <sip:alice@atlanta.example.com>;tag=9fxced76sl[HT][SP][HT] 
To: Bob <sip:bob@biloxi.example.com>[HT][SP][HT][HT][SP][HT][SP][SP] 
Call-ID: 3848276298220188511@atlanta.example.com[SP][HT][SP][SP] 
CSeq: 12345 INVITE 
Fig. 4. Example of usage of nonprintable characters as a covert channel for SIP 
4 Evaluation of Total Covert Data Transferred in VoIP Signalling  
Let us consider a scenario from Fig. 1 and based on that we will try to estimate how 
much information one may hide in signalling messages during the VoIP call. From 
Fig. 1 we can conclude that about 5 signalling messages may be sent in one direction 
between end users (two during initial signalling phase, two during the conversation 
e.g. OPTIONS message and one to end the call). Moreover, let us assume that two of 
these messages will carry also SDP body and that: 
• IP/TCP/UDP protocols steganography provides covert transmission at the rate of 
16 bits/message, 
• SIP parameters, tokens and fields steganography gives about 60 characters for the 
first SIP message that is total of 480 bits (usage of initial values), 
• SIP security mechanisms steganography which provides 160 bits per SIP message, 
• SDP protocol steganography that gives 60 characters for each SDP body (we as-
sumed two SDP bodies) that result in total of 960 bits, 
• Other SIP/SDP protocol steganography possibilities we assumed about 8 
bits/message. 
 
For the considered scenario from Fig. 1 and equation 1 we can easily calculate that 
BT = 2.36 kbits. Therefore, we see that even for only five SIP messages exchanged 
during VoIP call we can covertly transfer, in one direction, more than two thousand 
bits. That is why for high security requirements networks we may consider SIP steg-
anography as a potential threat to information security. 
5  Conclusions 
In this paper we have described existing and introduced new steganographic methods 
for SIP/SDP protocols. All new solutions are based on network steganography as they 
utilized free or unused fields in abovementioned protocols. Total amount of informa-
tion that may be transferred with use of proposed solutions is more than 2000 bits in 
one direction for each performed VoIP call. Although, this amount of information may 
be considered as low (as not many SIP/SDP messages are exchanged between end 
users), sometimes even this amount of data may be sufficient to cause serious informa-
tion leakage. 
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